Quick AnswerSince July 2021, Fla. Stat. §162.06(1)(b) bars a code inspector from starting a case on an anonymous complaint — the complainant must give a name and address first. That is the strongest argument available at the hearing itself. Constitutional selective-enforcement and retaliation claims are real but hard, and generally belong in a separate federal case, not before the magistrate.
Two versions of this call come in constantly. The first: "There are four houses on my street with the same thing and they only cited me." The second, quieter one: "I spoke at a commission meeting in March and the inspector showed up in April."
Both describe something the law recognizes. Neither is as easy to win as it sounds, and the honest version of this article says so up front.
Start with the statute, because it is the strongest tool you have
In 2021 Florida added §162.06(1)(b), and it changed the landscape for complaint-driven enforcement:
"A code inspector may not initiate enforcement proceedings for a potential violation of a duly enacted code or ordinance by way of an anonymous complaint. A person who reports a potential violation of a code or an ordinance must provide his or her name and address to the respective local government before an enforcement proceeding may occur."
There is an exception where the inspector has reason to believe the violation is an imminent threat to public health, safety, or welfare, or imminent destruction of habitat. Cities invoke it. Whether the inspector actually had that belief is a factual question, and the file will show it.
Two things make this provision valuable. It is statutory, so a Special Magistrate has to apply it — unlike a constitutional argument, which a magistrate generally has no jurisdiction to grant relief on. And it is testable: either the complaint record has a name and address, or it does not.
The honest caveat: the statute does not specify a remedy. We have not found a Florida appellate decision deciding whether a §162.06(1)(b) violation voids the notice, deprives the board of jurisdiction, or is merely directory. It is an open, litigable question — which is exactly why it is worth raising, and why nobody should promise you it ends the case.
There is a companion provision worth knowing. Section 162.06(1)(a) says no member of an enforcement board may initiate enforcement proceedings. If the records show a commissioner or board member drove the complaint against you, that is a separate statutory violation and a powerful fact.
Selective enforcement as a constitutional claim
The doctrine is old and it is real. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Supreme Court held that a facially neutral ordinance violates equal protection when it is "applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances."
You do not need to be part of a protected class. In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), the Court recognized a "class of one" equal protection claim: intentional treatment different from others similarly situated, with no rational basis for the difference. The facts are almost a code enforcement hypothetical — a village demanded a 33-foot easement from one property owner when it required 15 feet from everyone else, allegedly because she had sued it earlier.
Now the hard part. In the Eleventh Circuit, which governs Florida, comparators must be "prima facie identical in all relevant respects," and where the challenge is to complex, multi-factored government decisionmaking, similarly situated parties "must be very similar indeed." Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Irvin, 11th Cir. No. 06-12370 (Aug. 21, 2007). The plaintiff there lost. The Eleventh Circuit applied the same demanding standard to a Florida municipality in PBT Real Estate, LLC v. Town of Palm Beach, 11th Cir. No. 18-13920 (Feb. 22, 2021), and rejected the claim again.
"Four houses on my street" feels identical to you. Legally, it usually is not — different violation histories, different compliance timelines, different complaint origins, all of which give a city a rational basis. This is where most of these claims die.
One Florida owner did get past summary judgment on a class-of-one claim: Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, No. 08-80134-CIV (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2014), where the city pursued enforcement over dockage arrears while leaving others equally in arrears alone. That is a district court order, not binding precedent — but it shows the claim is not theoretical.
One clarification that saves a lot of confusion: if you search "selective enforcement Florida," most of what comes back is condominium and HOA law — an equitable defense about associations enforcing covenants unevenly. That is a completely different doctrine from constitutional selective enforcement against a government. They are routinely conflated online. They are not the same thing and the standards are not the same.
Retaliation: cited after you spoke up
The Eleventh Circuit's test for First Amendment retaliation has three parts: your speech was protected, the government's conduct adversely affected it, and there is a causal connection. Bennett v. Hendrix, 11th Cir. No. 04-12256 (Sept. 9, 2005). The adverse-effect test is objective — would the conduct likely deter a person of ordinary firmness — not whether you personally were chilled.
The obstacle is probable cause. Under Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019), probable cause generally defeats a retaliation claim. The Eleventh Circuit has extended that logic beyond arrests to civil actions, in a case out of a Florida town with a heavy public-records history: DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 11th Cir. No. 17-14177 (Nov. 21, 2019). Translated: if there really was a violation, your retaliation claim is in trouble.
Two decisions cut the other way, and both matter.
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 585 U.S. 87 (2018) — a Florida case — held that probable cause did not bar a retaliation claim where the allegation was that an official municipal policy of retaliation caused the action. The Court was careful to call the case "far afield from the typical retaliatory arrest claim." It requires proving a municipal policy, not just one inspector with a grudge.
And in Gonzalez v. Trevino, 602 U.S. ___ (2024), the Court rejected a requirement of virtually identical, named comparators, holding the only express limit on the evidence a plaintiff may offer is that it be objective. A survey showing nobody had previously been charged under a statute for comparable conduct was permissible.
That last holding is quietly the most useful thing in this article, because "objective evidence of non-enforcement against others" is exactly what a public records request produces.
What the records will tell you
Florida's public records law is genuinely strong. Under §119.07(1)(a), every custodian must permit inspection and copying at any reasonable time, and a custodian claiming an exemption has to cite the specific statutory basis.
In a code case worth testing, the request should reach: the complaint intake record itself, including the complainant's name and address (which §162.06(1)(b) now makes a required record); all complaints citing the same code section over a defined period, with dispositions; enforcement history for comparable properties in the same zoning district and time window, exported from the city's case-management system rather than pulled file by file; the inspector's field notes, activity logs, and photograph metadata; internal emails and texts among inspectors, supervisors, commissioners and the complainant; commission meeting minutes and audio for any meeting where you spoke; and any "imminent threat" determination used to bypass the anonymous-complaint rule.
A caution. Under §119.12, if you sue to enforce a records request you must give the custodian five business days' written notice first. And a court may deny your fees — and award the agency its fees — if the request or suit was for an improper purpose. Records requests are a tool, not a weapon.
The realistic picture
Where these arguments actually pay off is usually at the hearing, not in federal court. A magistrate has broad discretion over fines under Chapter 162, and "you cited me and not the four identical properties on my block, and here is the enforcement export showing it" moves that discretion — even where the magistrate will not treat it as a legal bar. Combined with a §162.06(1)(b) problem, it can end a case.
A federal §1983 damages claim is a different undertaking. You would face qualified immunity for the individual officials, and against the city you would need to satisfy Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) — no respondeat superior, so a rogue inspector generally is not enough to reach the city. You would need an official policy, a custom of repeated similar conduct, or a final policymaker who acted or ratified.
One timing trap to avoid: under §162.11 you have 30 days from execution of the order to appeal to circuit court, and that review is limited to the record made before the board. Do not let that window close while you are deciding whether to bring a federal case.
Most owners in this situation do best by treating the unevenness as leverage and as record-building — not as a lawsuit.
If you have a notice or an order in hand, send it to us. We review it at no cost and tell you in writing what your options are and what it costs — before you owe anything. Call (305) 396-1495 or start a free violation review. Flat-fee defense. No hourly billing.
This article is general information about Florida law, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship. Statutes and local ordinances change. Every case turns on its own facts — talk to a lawyer about yours.